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Does Italy Have a Stronger National Level of Industry Expertise Than a Local Level? 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Our paper examines whether the national level of auditor industry expertise is more 
dominant than the local level of expertise in Italy. Prior studies (Basioudis & Francis, 2007; 
Ferguson, Francis, & Stokes, 2003; Francis, Reichelt, & Wang, 2005) find that local industry 
experts charge a higher audit fee premium, suggesting that local expertise dominates in the U.S., 
Australia and the UK. Italy differs by having mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) (Republic 
of Italy, 1975), and a smaller local market for audits of publicly traded companies. Auditor 
industry expertise provides a conduit for transferring industry knowledge to the individual 
auditor. We predict that Italy should have a stronger national level of industry expertise, because 
higher client turnover under MAFR reduces the stability of clients at the local level which 
necessitates the national level to retain more industry expertise. As well, the smaller local market 
size generates fewer industry experts at the local level than the national level. In turn, the 
national level of expertise more efficiently transfers expertise to offices within the national 
network in a just-in-time basis as new clients are accepted.  
Our paper is interesting because little is known about how MAFR affects industry 
expertise. MAFR has been the subject of debate for several decades, and has reemerged in recent 
years following the 2007-09 financial crisis (European Commission, 2010; 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2013; Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), 
2011; The Conference Board, 2003). While Italy has had a MAFR requirement in place for more 
than four decades, the EU recently promulgated MAFR effective for 2016 fiscal years (European 
Parliament, 2014). Opponents argue that MAFR impairs industry expertise because a shorter 
tenure impairs the auditors acquisition of knowledge (Jamal, 2012), and can deteriorate office 
industry expertise when clients mandatorily change audit firms causing personnel to either 
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change industry specializations or else relocate (Daugherty, Dickins, Hatfield, & Higgs, 2012). 
We find evidence that audit fee premiums for national industry experts are higher than local 
industry experts, and we find corroborating evidence with audit hours.1  
We contribute to the literature by showing results that differ from prior studies that were 
conducted in voluntary rotation regimes where the local level is more dominant (Basioudis & 
Francis, 2007; Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005; Numan & Willekens, 2012). Our 
results demonstrate that industry expertise is organized on country characteristics, such as the 
presence of a mandatory auditor rotation regime. Thus, the dominance of the local level, shown 
in prior studies, does not apply to all countries. We corroborate our audit fee premium results by 
conducting the same analysis using a neighboring country without MAFR in the period analyzed, 
Germany, but with a similar legal system (code law). We find that audit fee for national industry 
leaders are no different than local level leaders, which provides further support that MAFR 
contributes to a stronger national level of industry expertise. 
Our paper is also interesting because little is known about whether audit fee premiums of 
industry experts reflect additional audit effort or are simply economic rents for holding more 
dominant client market shares. Prior studies show that clients of industry experts have higher 
audit quality (e.g., Balsam, Krishnan, & Yang, 2003; Dunn & Mayhew, 2004; Francis & Gunn, 
2015; Krishnan, 2003; Reichelt & Wang, 2010), however the validity of the findings have been 
questioned (Minutti-Meza, 2013). There is also evidence that audit fee premiums reflect 
economic rents (Numan & Willekens, 2012). If audit fee premiums reflect effort, rather than 
economic rents, we should expect to find higher audit hours. A study by Bae, Choi, and Rho 
                                                 
1 We do not examine audit quality because it is outside the scope of our paper, and adding it would increase the 
length of the paper.  
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(2016) provides evidence from S. Korea that audit fee premiums reflect greater audit hours; 
however, their study only examines national industry expertise in a regime with both MAFR and 
voluntary rotation. We extend Bae et al. (2016) by not only showing that national industry 
experts expend more audit hours relative to non-experts in a MAFR regime, but also local 
industry experts expend more audit hours. 
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background literature, and 
predictions. Section 3 discusses the empirical design including the sample and descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 reports the results including robustness tests. Section 5 concludes. 
2. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1 National and Office Level Industry Expertise  
Industry expertise stems from the investment in human capital in accounting 
professionals and the experience they gain from servicing clients (Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis 
et al., 2005; Solomon, Shields, & Whittington, 1999). National industry expertise and local 
industry expertise (hereafter, office industry expertise) are distinct levels of auditor industry 
expertise. National industry expertise is characterized by a firm-wide reputation for industry 
expertise, organization of expertise by industry, and various knowledge-sharing practices 
(Francis et al., 2005; Hogan & Jeter, 1999; Solomon et al., 1999). Knowledge sharing practices 
include internal benchmarking of best practices, standardized audit programs, industry specific 
databases, training programs, and the transfer of expert personnel to other offices through travel 
and consulting arrangements (Francis et al., 2005; Zerni, 2012).2 Office-level industry expertise 
                                                 
2 Information technology used for knowledge sharing include: KPMG’s KWorldTM, PriceWaterhouseCooper’s 
TeamAssetTM and KnowledgeCurveTM, and Ernst and Young’s KnowledgeWebTM (Zerni, 2012). See Vera-Munoz, 
Ho, and Chow (2006) for further discussion of factors affecting knowledge sharing within international accounting 
firms.  
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consists of deep industry and client knowledge possessed by audit personnel within a particular 
office (Francis et al., 2005). Human capital attributes are important to develop audit firm 
performance (Samagaio & Rodrigues, 2016). Audit personnel gain their expertise from the direct 
experience of working exclusively on industry specific engagements (Solomon et al., 1999).  
The two levels of industry expertise transfer knowledge in different ways. National 
industry expertise is transferred from the national headquarters (or through an office expert) to 
offices within the national network through standardized firm policies and procedures and 
knowledge-sharing practices. Office industry expertise is transferred within the office by quality 
control procedures (e.g., supervision/coaching) and individual on-the-job experience.  
National industry expertise ensures expertise is retained within the audit firm, and is 
transferred to offices that are in need of it. Mandatory audit firm rotation increases the 
importance of the national level, because if a sufficiently large number of clients in a particular 
industry rotate to another firm, the office will lose the knowledge and it will eventually be 
forgotten (Causholli, 2016). In order to retain the industry expertise in the audit firm, distinct 
knowledge sharing practices and firm-wide policies and procedures are needed at the national 
level. As new industry-specific clients are accepted, offices will require industry-specific 
knowledge to be transferred by the national level. While there are distinct differences in national 
and office level expertise, more germane to our study is understanding which level dominates by 
audit fee premium. 
 Prior studies provide evidence that office level of industry expertise dominates in audit 
fee premium over national level. Appendix A provides a list of studies examining audit fee 
premiums by national and office levels, country, and time period. These studies identify the 
national industry expert as the audit firm with the highest market share in a particular industry, 
4 
 
and the office industry expert as the same but for a particular city. The list shows that audit fee 
premiums for national industry experts range between statistically insignificant amounts to 8 
percent, and between 13 percent and 16 percent for office industry experts. All of these studies 
examine countries with no MAFR requirement. Thus, it is unclear from these studies whether 
audit fee premiums differ between national industry expertise and office industry expertise under 
MAFR. To explore this matter further, we discuss the nature of audit fee premiums and industry 
expertise. 
2.2 Audit Fee Premiums and Industry Expertise 
Audit fee premiums consist of additional audit effort and economic rents (Okeefe, 
Simunic, & Stein, 1994; Simunic, 2014). They indicate that audit firms adopt a differentiation 
strategy (Cahan, Jeter, & Naiker, 2011; Francis et al., 2005; Jeter, 2014) by delivering higher 
audit quality with greater direct labor hours and greater investments in knowledge sharing. It is 
well documented in prior studies that industry experts are associated with higher audit quality, as 
evident from studies comparing earnings quality, disclosure quality and going concern opinion 
frequency (Balsam et al., 2003; Dunn & Mayhew, 2004; Francis & Gunn, 2015; Krishnan, 2003; 
Reichelt & Wang, 2010).3  
Higher audit quality also infers that auditors will expend greater audit hours (Palmrose, 
1986, 108), as evident from audit production theory (Okeefe et al., 1994; Simunic, 2014). For 
instance, auditors will expend more hours to more effectively constrain management’s attempts 
to manipulate earnings with discretionary accruals. In support, Caramanis and Lennox (2008) 
find that audit hours are negatively associated with the likelihood and magnitude of income-
                                                 
3 Some studies believe that industry specialization measures are contentious (e.g., Minutti-Meza, 2013). 
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increasing discretionary accruals. In a study using S. Korean data, Bae et al. (2016) report that 
national industry expert auditors expend greater audit fees (and earn higher audit hours) than 
non-experts. They argue that industry expert auditors will expend more hours because they 
require additional evidence, and they protect their reputation in a competitive market (Bae et al., 
2016).  
However, their results may not generalize to our setting because 1) S. Korea has weaker 
investor protection (Wingate, 1997), lower audit quality, and weaker enforcement of accounting 
standards  (Brown, Preiato, & Tarca, 2014), 2) their sample period includes a mandatory audit 
firm rotation regime followed by a voluntary firm rotation regime, and 3) they do not examine 
the local level of auditor expertise. Thus, our results are more generalizable to other EU 
countries who recently adopted MAFR reforms (European Parliament, 2014). To better 
understand our setting, we turn our discussion to Italy’s regulatory environment. 
2.3 Mandatory Auditor Rotation and Regulatory Developments in Italy 
Italy adopted mandatory audit firm rotation in 1975 under Presidential Decree D.P.R. No. 
136 (Republic of Italy, 1975). Under this law, publicly listed companies must mandatorily rotate 
their audit firm every nine years. Recently, the European Parliament passed Regulation No. 537 in 
2014 (effective in 2016) requiring a ten-year MAFR term, with an additional ten-year term if the 
audit engagement is put out for public bid (European Parliament, 2014).4  
Studies examining audit fees and audit hours within MAFR regimes are limited. 
Cameran, Francis, Marra, and Pettinicchio (2015) show in Italy that after a client rotates to 
another audit firm, audit fees are lower and audit hours are higher in the first year. Kwon, Lim, 
                                                 
4 However, efforts in the U.S. to pass a MAFR requirement met with overwhelming resistance by the audit 
profession and financial executives (Orenstein, 2013; Ryan, 2013; Tysiac, 2013). 
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and Simnett (2014) show in S. Korea that when the country changed from a voluntary audit firm 
rotation regime to a mandatory rotation regime, audit fees and audit hours increased. Kwon et al. 
(2014) compare national industry market shares in S. Korea during the time of change to MAFR 
and find a decline in national industry market shares after MAFR was implemented.  
A concurrent study by Mazza, Azzali and Reichelt (2017) conducts interviews of Big 4 
partners in Italy to gain a better understanding of how industry specialization operates in the 
country. They find that industry specialization in Italy operates at an area level and at a national 
level. Unlike the U.S., the area level subsumes the office level because two offices (Milan and 
Rome) dominate in revenues (56 percent). They also learn that partners express a strong desire to 
retain industry knowledge at the national level.  
2.4 Hypothesis 
Prior literature finds that in the U.S., U.K., and Australia, industry specialization is a joint 
effect of a national level and a local office level, and that the local level dominates over the 
national level in audit fee premium (Basioudis & Francis, 2007; Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et 
al., 2005). However, the institutional and audit market characteristics of Italy differ from the 
countries in these studies, such that the national level is arguably more dominant than the local 
level. We argue that Italy’s higher client turnover and its smaller publicly-listed audit market, 
heightens the sensitivity of the loss of tacit industry-specific knowledge at the local level, and 
consequently heightens the sensitivity of lost industry expertise. To retain industry expertise in 
the audit firm, a stronger national level of industry expertise is needed. 
Italy’s nine-year mandatory audit firm rotation term shortens audit firm tenure and 
increases the turnover of publicly-traded clients. Compared to the U.S., where audit firm tenure 
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averages 12 years (Davis, Soo, & Trompeter, 2009), Italy has an average audit firm tenure of 4.5 
years and a substantially higher client turnover. With a nine-year maximum MAFR term, at least 
one-ninth of the publicly traded clients annually depart the office, on average, with a potential 
replacement from another audit firm, which may be in a different industry. Higher client turnover 
leads to a greater risk that industry-specific knowledge is forgotten in the office, when there are 
insufficient industry clients to maintain the learning experience (Causholli, 2016). Weakened 
industry expertise is echoed by opponents of MAFR who claim that the accretion of industry 
expertise is impaired by a shorter client-auditor engagement term (Jamal, 2012). In order to 
retain industry-specific knowledge in the firm and transfer it to offices in need, the national level 
should be more dominant than in countries with voluntary audit firm rotation.  
Under MAFR, tacit industry knowledge is more vulnerable to being forgotten at the local 
office level. Tacit knowledge, compared to explicit knowledge, is transferred by socialization 
such as highly interactive conversations, observations, and shared experiences, such as between 
consulting partners and engagement partners (Causholli, 2016; Vera-Munoz et al., 2006). On the 
other hand, explicit knowledge is transferred by written communication such as industry 
documentation of common risks and common accounting methods. Tacit knowledge includes 
auditor judgment such as assessment of risk, materiality, and detecting client errors. Auditor 
judgment involves complex decisions that are learned from prior industry engagements by 
interacting with experienced audit professionals. For instance, an auditor in the construction 
industry would learn about assessing the risk of misstated revenue, under the percentage of 
completion method, by discussing their assessment with a national industry expert. With greater 
client turnover, more socialized national knowledge sharing is needed to transfer tacit industry-
specific knowledge to the local offices. Tacit industry knowledge is transferred by training and 
8 
 
consulting from industry expert partners at the national headquarters and from other offices 
(Mazza et al. 2017).  
The loss of tacit industry knowledge from higher client turnover is exasperated by Italy’s 
smaller local audit market for publicly-traded clients. There are an estimated 10 publicly-listed 
clients per city among the Big 4 in Italy’s 20 cities (Cameran et al., 2015).5 However, in the U.S., 
there are an estimated 32 clients per city, among 202 metropolitan statistical areas (Reichelt and 
Wang 2010).6 Compared to the U.S., Italy has three times fewer clients per office, but is similar 
to other EU countries.7 If an office loses a sufficient number of clients in an industry, the tacit 
industry knowledge will be easily forgotten. For instance, ENI S.p.A. – a Global Fortune 500 
client in the energy industry, could potentially result in the loss of most of the energy industry 
knowledge for the Rome office. In turn, a smaller audit market increases the need to retain tacit 
industry knowledge, because local industry expertise does not sufficiently develop, rather it 
develops stronger at the national level.  
Industry expertise is transferred to offices within the audit firm when one office loses a 
client in a particular industry and another office gains a different client in the same industry 
(particularly a large client). National industry expertise is transferred by internal benchmarking 
of best practices, standardized audit programs, industry specific databases, training programs, 
and the transfer of expert personnel to other offices through travel and consulting arrangements 
(Francis et al., 2005; Zerni, 2012). Expert personnel provide training and consulting from the 
                                                 
5 Cameran et al. (2005) report that Italy has 204 publicly-listed clients. According to the Big 4 websites in Italy, the 
Big 4 offices are located in 20 cities on average (between 16 and 25).  
6 Reichelt and Wang (2010) report 32,479 firm-year observations over five years (2003-07) in 202 unique 
metropolitan statistical areas; an average of 32 publicly-listed clients. 
7 Zerni (2012) reports from Swedish data that there are an average of 172 firms per year. According to the Big 4 
websites, there are an average of 56 offices (EY: 50, PWC: 100, KPMG: 50, and Deloitte: 25); thus, each office has 
an average of three publicly-listed client firms. 
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national headquarters and from other offices (Mazza et al. 2017). In Italy, higher client turnover 
from MAFR and a smaller audit market for publicly-traded clients, arguably makes the national 
level of industry expertise more important for retaining and transferring industry-specific 
knowledge to offices within the audit firm.  
Turning the discussion to audit fee premiums of industry experts. Prior studies report that 
industry experts incur an audit fee premium (Basioudis & Francis, 2007; Ferguson et al., 2003; 
Francis et al., 2005; Reichelt & Wang, 2010). A consequence of stronger national industry 
expertise is that audit fee premiums are higher than local industry expertise. These studies have 
defined industry experts as the industry market leader. Our first hypothesis follows. 
Hypothesis 1 –audit fee premiums are higher for national level industry leaders than for local 
level industry leaders.  
3. EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
3.1 Industry specialization measures 
We employ two levels of industry expertise: a national level and a local level. For the 
national level, we define a national industry specialist as the audit firm that is the leader in 
market share of client sales for a particular industry and year (Bae et al., 2016). Use of sales, 
rather than audit fees, mitigates the mechanical relation between audit fee premiums and auditor 
market share, identified by Minutti-Meza (2013). We also use client sales, rather than audit fees, 
because the sample is larger, which yields a more accurate market leadership measure. In our 
robustness tests, we find support for this choice. Industries are classified by the Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS). GICS is superior to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
in capital market research applications (Bhojraj, Lee, & Oler, 2003).  
10 
 
In Italy, the Big 4 local level is organized by area (Mazza et al. 2017). The large majority 
of audit fee revenues (untabulated, 56 percent) are from the two area head offices (Milan –44%. 
and Rome – 12%), while partners work in multiple offices within the same area (Mazza et al. 
2017). Rather than using the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), available in the U.S. (e.g., 
Reichelt & Wang, 2010), or the geographical city in the U.K. (e.g., Basioudis & Francis, 2007), 
we use area because it is similar to the MSA. Studies that use U.S. data specify auditor local 
specialization in terms of the MSA in which the audit office is located. The U.S. Census Bureau 
defines an MSA as the core of the city and the surrounding areas that have commuter relations 
with the core. The MSA represents a geographic-economic unit within which individuals have 
frequent and close contact by commuter relations with the core. The frequent and close contact 
facilitates the transfer of tacit knowledge. The European Commission’s statistics division 
(EUROSTAT) defines European areas based on the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
Statistics (NUTS). The NUTS area is similar to the US MSA because people who reside in an 
area typically have close family contacts, and travel by car or train is convenient, inexpensive, 
and does not require an overnight stay.  
We choose the two major industrial areas of Italy: the North and the Center-South. The 
two areas are more representative of Italy’s industrial activity, even though the unit of measure is 
biased against finding results.8 At least two other studies concur that many countries have one or 
two major cities were publicly-listed clients are located (Francis, Michas, & Seavey, 2013; Lim 
& Tan, 2009). Industries tend to geographically cluster (Porter, 1990, 154) with the greatest 
                                                 
8 Italy is organized into three geographic areas (North, Center and South) as defined by the European Commission’s 
statistics division (EUROSTAT) and by the Italian National Institute for Statistics (Instituto Nationale di Statistica 
(ISTAT), 2014) using standard territorial definitions from the NUTS. However, because there is so little industrial 
activity in the South, only one industry leader appears in the South for the entire sample period (2005-13); 
consequently, we combine the Center and South areas into one industrial area.  
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number in the North area (National Observatory of Italian Districts, 2009). Italy’s economy is 
largely driven by the manufacture of high quality consumer goods, and consists of a developed 
industrial north and a less developed agricultural south (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). 
We also provide analysis using the city level, based on the 20 government regions, to support our 
conjecture that the area level is the more appropriate measure. Following prior literature (e.g., 
Basioudis & Francis, 2007; Francis et al., 2005; Reichelt & Wang, 2010), a Big 4 audit firm is 
considered an industry leader if there is at least one other audit firm in the same area, industry 
and year. This restriction ensures that a sole audit firm in a particular area and industry is not 
assigned an industry expert because of an uncompetitive market (Francis et al. 2005).  
Table 1 reports the audit firms that are industry leaders by industry and year. Panel A 
reports the national level, Panel B reports the area level for the North and the Center-South. All 
panels report considerable variation over time in industry leaders, partly because of mandatory 
rotation of audit firms. Beginning with national industry leaders, Panel A reports that PWC is the 
most frequent industry leader (28 out of 72 industry-years). Each Big 4 firm on average has 22 
percent of the market share (Table 3). In untabulated results, the mean market share for the 
national leader is 27 percent and for the second place national leader is 22 percent. At the area 
level, the mean market share for the leader is 23 percent, and for the second leader is 22 percent. 
At the city level, the mean market share for the leader is 27 percent, and for the second leader is 
23 percent. Compared to the U.S. (Francis et al., 2005), Italy has a lower mean market share for 
national, area and city leaders (27, 23, 27 percent vs. 50 percent at the national level and 69 
percent at the city level), but compared with Australia (Fergusson et al., 2003), Italy has a similar 
mean market share for national leaders (27 percent vs. 28 percent). Moving to area industry 
leaders, Panels B report that there is considerable variation in industry leadership over time.  
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[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
3.2 Multivariate Tests 
To test our prediction, we estimate equation (1): 
LAF = β0 + β1INDUSTRY LEADER + β2SIZE + β3CATA + β4QUICK + β5LEV + 
   β6ROA + β7LOSS + β8σ (CFO) + β9SALES GROWTH + β10TENURE +  
β11|ACCR_1|+ β12BIGN + β13UNCLEAN_OPINION + β14LAF_UNCONS + 
β15LABOR_COST + INDUSTRY AND YEAR FIXED EFFECTS + e  (1). 
Equation (1) is estimated with industry and year ﬁxed-effects in order to control for 
systematic differences in audit fees across industries and across time. We cluster robust standard 
errors by client firm to control for heteroskedasticity and the lack of temporal independence of 
residuals within client firms (Petersen, 2009), and to avoid firm-fixed effects estimation when it 
is not feasible (Wooldridge, 2016, 450).9 Variable definitions are described in Appendix B. 
LAF is the log of total audit fees. Total audit fees include the audit of the financial 
statements of the consolidated entity, and the audit of the individual financial statements of the 
parent and the subsidiaries (group accounts). We include not just the audit of the consolidated 
entity but also of the group accounts to better measure complexity (size, international presence, 
and dominance of the parent company) and related audit effort.10 These audit fees do not include 
non-audit fees for non-audit services because Italy restricts auditors from providing non-audit 
services. LAH is the log of audit hours for the total audit fees. Equation (1) estimates audit hours 
using the same model as audit fees, following prior studies (Bae et al., 2016; Cameran et al., 
2015). 
                                                 
9 Firm fixed effects are not feasible when sufficient degrees of freedom are lost and type II errors are more likely.  
10 Audit fees also include interim financial reviews and accounting procedure audits. 
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INDUSTRY LEADER is the variable of interest and denotes three indicator variables for 
industry specialization: a national industry leader, an area industry leader, and a city industry 
leader.11 To test our hypothesis, we expect the coefficient on the INDUSTRY LEADER variables 
to be positive, and we expect that the coefficient on the national leader is greater than that of the 
area industry leader.  
Control variables for estimating audit fees are based on prior studies examining audit fees 
and earnings quality (e.g., Basioudis & Francis, 2007; Donohoe & Knechel, 2014; Francis et al., 
2005; Reichelt & Wang, 2010).12 Client size (SIZE) is the log of total assets. Several prior 
studies measure client risk by CATA, QUICK, ROA, LEV, and UNCLEAN OPINION. We also 
control for volatility of operating cash ﬂows  (σ (CFO)) (Donohoe & Knechel, 2014; Graham, 
Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005), SALES GROWTH for economic life cycle (Dickinson, 2011), 
TENURE for growth in audit fees with audit firm tenure (Cameran et al., 2015; Donohoe & 
Knechel, 2014), and total accruals magnitude (|ACCR_1|) for earnings quality (Hribar, Kravet, & 
Wilson, 2014). BIGN controls for audit firm size and Big 4 brand-name.  
3.3 Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample selection starts with all Italian companies listed on the Milan Stock Exchange 
that are available on Compustat Global. We exclude the financial sector from our analysis 
                                                 
11 For the purpose of the city leader variable, we base the city on the 20 Italian government-based regions. They are: 
North (Valle d’Aosta, Veneto, Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Emilia Romagna, Lombardia, Liguria, 
Piemonte), Center (Lazio, Toscana, Umbria, Marche) and South (Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Basilicata, Puglia, 
Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna). The Big 4 audit firms have approximately one office in each region. 
12 Given that we have a small sample size compared to previous studies, we are careful to select control variables to 
avoid problems related to the degree of freedoms from adding too many independent variables. We do not include 
client firm age because the Italian listed firms are on average very old (some are hundreds of years). We do not 
include years of listing because Italian firms often use loan financing before the firm is listed on a stock exchange. 
We do not include the fiscal year-end because a very large proportion of our sample (95%) has a December 31 year-
end. We do not include the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of auditor area industry concentration (Numan & 
Willekens, 2012) because the coefficient was not significant (p>0.10), and there is too little variation over time to be 
reliable for fixed effects estimation. We do not include the number of business segments because Compustat does 
not report it, and we use size to control for complexity. In our robustness tests, we use a hand-collected business 
segments variable from a smaller sample, and our main results still hold. 
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because of its dissimilar nature, and we exclude the telecommunications sector because there are 
too few observations to compute auditor industry specialization variables. We create a separate 
sample of audit hours for additional analysis. Our sample period is from 2005 to 2013. This 
period is chosen because too few observations are available prior to 2005, and IFRS was adopted 
in 2005 (European Parliament, 2002), which allows a cleaner estimation of the audit fee and 
audit hour models.  
Table 2, details the sample selection process for the sample. The sample starts with 2,096 
non-financial and non-telecommunication firm-year observations from Compustat Global. We 
hand-collect the names of the audit firms directly from the auditor’s report in the consolidated 
annual report to ensure accurate identification. We delete 126 firm-year observations without an 
identified audit firm and other variables required to compute industry market share. We require a 
minimum of two audit firms per area-industry-year combination to identify an auditor industry 
market leader (Francis et al., 2005). The sub-total is 1,970 firm-year observations.  
Next, we hand-collect audit fees and audit hours from publicly available annual 
shareholder meeting minutes of Italian-listed companies. Two of the authors (who are faculty 
members at an Italian university) organized a team of seven research assistants to download the 
annual shareholder meeting minutes from the client firm’s websites. From March to June, 2015, 
the team manually downloaded the minutes and extracted the audit fees and hours into a 
spreadsheet, which was checked for accuracy in July, 2015 by different research assistants. The 
faculty members met with the team every two weeks to plan and control the quantity and quality 
of the data. Appendix C provides two examples of the disclosures of audit fees and hours: Pirreli 
& C. S.p.A., and Davide Campari-Milano S.p.A. After deducting observations with missing audit 
fees, hours, and control variable values, the final sample consists of 1,050 firm-year observations 
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for audit fees, and 1,123 firm-year observations for audit hours.13 Based on the nine-year audit 
fee (audit hour) sample, there are 58 (62) clients per area per year. At the office level, among the 
approximately 20 cities in Italy, there are an average of 5.8 (6.2) clients per city per year. At the 
area level, there are an average of seven clients per area-industry-year combination. Compared to 
the area level, the office level has fewer industry-year combinations available to compute an 
auditor industry leader. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the Italy sample. The mean client fundamental 
variables (LAH, LAF, SIZE, LEV, ROA, LOSS, and TENURE) are comparable to those used by 
Cameran et al. (2015), except that mean SIZE is lower in our sample because Cameran et al. 
(2005) excludes non-Big 4 clients. Other client fundamental variables (CATA, QUICK, σ(CFO), 
SALES GROWTH, and BIGN) are comparable to other related studies (Basioudis & Francis, 
2007; Carson, 2009; Corbella, Florio, Gotti, & Mastrolia, 2015; Reichelt & Wang, 2010). The 
mean National Leader (35.2%) is comparable to Basioudis and Francis (2007) who report 33.6% 
in the U.K. The mean Area Leader (39.7%) and mean City Leader (37.9%) are comparable to the 
same study’s mean city leader variable (46.8%).  
 [INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
The correlation matrix (Table 4) shows that the auditor leadership variables are positively 
correlated with audit fees and audit hours. Table 4 does not show significant problems of 
multicollinearity.14 The correlations among many of the independent variables are under 50 
percent (except SIZE and LAF, LOSS and ROA, and QUICK and LEV). National Leader and 
                                                 
13 Some companies disclose only audit hours and no audit fees. 
14 For equation (1), we find no evidence of multicollinearity, since all variance inflation factors are under 7.51, which 
is well below the threshold of 10 (Kennedy, 2008, 199). 
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Area Leader are highly correlated (greater than 70%), while City Leader is highly correlated 
with National Leader (47%) and Area Leader (58%). Thus, we estimate equation (1) separately 
for the three leadership variables, and test the difference in the National Leader and Area Leader 
coefficients by simultaneous equation estimation.  
 [INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
4. MULTIVARIATE RESULTS  
4.1 Main Results 
The results of estimating equation (1) are reported in Table 5 for testing the relation 
between national and area levels of auditor industry expertise and audit fees  Table 5, Panel A, 
reports that the national level of industry leadership has a 20.5 percent audit fee premium (over 
non-leaders) (p<0.01) which is greater than the area level audit fee premium of 11.4 percent 
(p<0.10, one-tailed).15 The city level of industry leadership is not significantly different from 
zero; suggesting that city level leadership is virtually non-existent. This result also suggests that 
the area level is a more appropriate unit of industry leadership than the city level.  
Panel B reports that the difference between the audit fee premium of the national industry 
leader and the area industry leader is statistically significant (p<0.05, one-tailed), which supports 
hypothesis 1. It is also economically significant – national industry leaders have a 10.7 percent 
greater fee premium for national industry leaders than area industry leaders over non-leaders. 
Audit fee premiums are comparable to prior studies (e.g., Francis et al. 2005), except that Italy’s 
national level is greater. 
                                                 
15 Following Craswell, Francis, and Taylor (1995), the audit fee premium in percentage points is (ez -1)*100, where 
z is the coefficient on the industry leader variable.  
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In short, national industry experts have a higher audit fee premium over area industry 
experts. We do not observe an audit fee premium for the city level of industry expertise, likely 
because each area is dominated by a major city – Milan in the North, and Rome in the Center-
South, consistent with Mazza et al. (2017). In a country where the audit regulatory environment 
is characterized by mandatory audit firm rotation versus other countries that have voluntary audit 
firm rotation (Australia, UK, US, and NZ), and a smaller audit market, we observe a more 
centralized organization of industry expertise at the national level. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
4.2 Additional Analysis 
4.2.1 Audit Hours Analysis 
Audit fees reflect audit hours expected by audit personnel (Cameran et al., 2015; 
Simunic, 1980), so we expect that audit hour premiums should be higher for national industry 
experts than local industry experts. A related paper by Bae et al. (2016) find that audit hours are 
higher for national industry experts.  
We hand-collect audit hours when audit fees were hand-collected. We substitute audit 
hours for audit fees in equation (1), and estimate the equaiton. Table 6, Panel A reports that audit 
hours are higher for national industry leaders (over non-leaders) by 18.3 percent (p<0.01) 
compared to 10.1 percent (p<0.10, one-tailed) by area industry leaders, and the difference is 
statistically significant (Panel B) and economically significant – national industry leaders have 
9.5 percent greater hours than area industry leaders over non-leaders. These results corroborate 
our main results with audit fees, and suggest that national industry experts expend greater hours 
than area level industry experts. These results imply that industry expert auditors use a 
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differentiation strategy to distinguish higher quality in audit hours in a setting that is 
characterized by mandatory audit firm rotation, a smaller audit market, and more centralized 
industry expertise. National industry experts appear to be stronger differentiators than area 
industry experts. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
4.2.2 Auditor Industry Leadership in Germany 
For comparison purposes, we perform analysis of audit fees of a neighboring country – 
Germany (audit hours are not publicly available). We choose Germany because it is similar all 
respects except that it does not have mandatory audit firm rotation. Its population (83 million) is 
similar to that of Italy (61 million). It did not have MAFR during the sample period (2005-2013) 
(Lennox, 2014). Untabulated results show that our sample of German listed firms has a 
maximum audit tenure of 20 years and a high frequency of firms audited by the same audit firms 
for 12 years. It adopted the same audit standards (IAASB) and accounting standards (IFRS) as a 
European Union member (European Parliament, 2002). It has a code law requirement (Brown et 
al., 2014; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). It has similar accounting and 
auditing quality. Brown et al. (2014) assigns Germany and Italy a similar accounting 
enforcement rating (44 and 46, respectively), and a similar audit quality rating (23 and 27, 
respectively).16 We did not choose the next most similar country, France, because it has a joint 
audit requirement which would be less comparable for computing industry expertise (Francis, 
Richard, & Vanstraelen, 2009). We divide Germany into two areas, East and West, based on the 
16 NUTS subdivisions.  
                                                 
16 Brown et al. (2014) surveys 51 countries, and reports for 2008 that the audit quality index has a mean of 18.25 and 
a standard deviation of 8.27, and the accounting enforcement index as a mean of 12.59 and a standard deviation of 
6.65. 
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Table 7, Panels A and B, report supporting tables for audit firm leaders in Germany for 
the national level and the area level, respectively. Panel A reports that PWC (33 industry years) 
and KPMG (37) are the two dominant national audit firm leaders in Germany, accounting for 70 
out of 72 industry years, while EY and PKF appear only once, and DT does not appear at all. 
Compared to Italy, Germany’s national audit firm leaders are concentrated among two Big 4 
audit firms, while Italy is more equally distributed among the Big 4. Panel B reports that the East 
area is more equally distributed among three of the Big 4: PWC (37), KPMG (22), and EY (13), 
when compared to the West where KPMG (46) is more dominant, followed by PWC (20), EY 
(5), and PKF (1). 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
Our sample includes all German companies that are available from the EURbusiness 
database and Compustat Global. Similar to the sample of companies from Italy, we exclude the 
financial sector telecommunications sector from our analysis. The sample of companies from 
Germany includes publicly-listed companies over the sample period 2005-2013.  
Table 8 details the sample selection process for the Germany sample. We use the EUR 
business database to obtain audit fees, and we join it with the Compustat Global database for 
financial statement variables and audit variables (tenure and opinion). The final sample size has 
2,910 firm-year observations, after deducting 1,028 observations with missing values necessary 
to compute auditor expertise, and 1,307 observations with missing audit fees and control variable 
data. There are an average 161 clients per area per year. Among the 16 subdivisions in Germany, 
there are an average of 20.2 companies per subdivision per year. The Germany sample is larger 
(2,910) than the Italian sample (1,050) and has more observations per area. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
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Table 9 reports descriptive statistics for the Germany sample. Many of the variables are 
comparable to Italy, with a few exceptions. The Germany sample has lower financial leverage, 
smaller Big N audit market share, and less frequent auditor industry leadership. Prior cross-
country studies (Kwon, Lim, & Tan, 2007; Lim & Tan, 2009) show a similar pattern for these 
exceptions. Audit firm tenure is greater for the Germany sample because Germany does not have 
mandatory audit firm rotation. 
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
The correlation matrix for the German sample (Table 10) shows similar to the Italy 
sample results. Auditor leadership variables are positively correlated with audit fees and audit 
hours. Correlations among the independent variables are under 50 percent (except for SIZE and 
LAF, LOSS and ROA). National Leader is highly correlated with Area Leader (56%), while City 
Leader is highly correlated with National Leader (29%) and Area Leader (44%).17 
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
For the Germany sample, the results of estimating equation (1) for hypothesis 1 are 
reported in Table 11. We compare whether audit fee premiums differ between the national and 
local levels for Germany which does not have mandatory audit firm rotation. Table 11 reports 
that the national industry leader has an audit fee premium of 14.5 percent (p< 0.01), and the area 
industry leader has an audit fee premium of 12.2 percent (p< 0.05); however these premiums are 
not statistically different (p= 0.373). In short, we conclude that the audit fee premium is no 
different between the national level and the local level. Given that Germany does not have 
MAFR, and Italy does, MAFR likely contributes to a stronger national level of industry 
                                                 
17 For equation (1) for Germany, we find no evidence of multicollinearity, since all variance inflation factors are 
under 7.23, which is well below the threshold of 10 (Kennedy, 2008, 199) 
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expertise. However, we cannot rule out that the larger area size of Germany contributes to the 
difference. 
 [INSERT TABLE 11 HERE] 
4.2.3 Auditor Industry Leadership Based on Client Lagged Total Assets  
We repeat the analysis for the Italy sample by changing the industry leader definition 
using client lagged total assets (Francis et al., 2005, 130), for the purpose of computing auditor 
industry market share. Using lagged client assets mitigates any potential mechanical relation 
between market share and audit fee premium (Minutti-Meza, 2013).18 The coefficient 
(untabulated) on the national industry leader is greater than the area industry leader for both audit 
fees (20.1 percent vs. 8.7 percent), and the difference is statistically significant for audit fees 
(p<0.05).19 These results suggest that are main results are robust to an alternative measure of 
industry leadership. 
4.2.4 Audit fees for the audit of parent companies  
The main analysis uses audit fees reported in the minutes of the annual shareholder 
meeting (see Appendix C for examples). They include the review of the interim financial 
statements and accounting procedures, the statutory audit of the consolidated financial 
statements, and the statutory audit of the group accounts. Most of the companies in our sample 
report a total amount for these three items. For robustness, we restrict our analysis to a 
subsample of firms that report separate audit fees and audit hours for the consolidated financial 
                                                 
18 We repeat the analysis computing industry leadership of the national industry leader and the area industry leader 
by market share of audit fees and by market share of audit hours. We find that our results are not consistent when 
compared to using market share of client assets or client sales. We conclude that client sales and client assets are 
more reliable, likely because there are more observations to accurately compute the auditor’s industry market share.  
19 We find robust results with audit hours (14.6 percent vs. 4.6 percent), and the difference is statistically significant 
(p<0.05). 
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statement audit (n=664) and a subsample of firms that separately report the statutory audit of the 
group accounts (n=564). We find for the consolidated financial statement audit subsample, there 
is an audit fee premium for the national industry leader (37.4 percent, p=0.004) that is higher 
than the area industry leader (10.8 percent, p=0.34), and the difference is statistically significant 
(p<0.01) (untabulated). We find for the group accounts sub-sample, there is an audit fee 
premium for the national industry leader (26.9 percent, p=0.01) that is higher than the area 
industry leader (9.4 percent, p=0.344), and the difference is statistically significant (p=0.02) 
(untabulated). In short, our results are robust to separating audit fees between the consolidated 
financial statement audit and the group accounts audit.20 
4.2.5 Complexity 
To rule out the possibility that complexity is an omitted variable, we add to equation (1) 
the number of business segments, the number of subsidiaries, and foreign revenue. We hand-
collected these variables for the period 2008–2011 for a subsample of 414 observations with 
available data, following the Cameran et al. (2015) model. We find that the coefficient on the 
national industry leader variable remains positive and statistically significant (0.260, p<0.01), the 
coefficient on the area industry leader variable remains positive and statistically significant 
(0.145, p=0.05, one-tailed), and the national leader has a higher fee premium than the area leader 
(p=0.04) (untabulated).21 In short, our results are robust to controlling for complexity. 
 4.2.6 Hourly rate 
                                                 
20 For audit hours, the results are robust. There is a premium for the national industry leader for the consolidated 
financial statements audit subsample (33.1 percent, p<0.01) that is greater than the area industry leader (8.2 percent, 
p=0.43), and the difference is statistically significant (p<0.01). As well, there is an audit hour premium for the group 
accounts subsample for the national industry leader (24.8 percent, p=0.03) that is greater than the area industry 
leader (7.3 percent, p=0.49), and the difference is statistically significant (p= 0.03) (untabulated). 
21 For audit hours, we find that the coefficient on the national industry leader variable is positive and statistically 
significant (0.202, p=0.04), and the coefficient on the area industry leader variable is positive (0.139, p=0.06, one-
tailed) even though the difference is less evident (p=0.28) (untabulated). The less significant results are likely 
because of the reduced sample size from 1,123 to 414 firm-year observations. 
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Different from Bae et al. (2016), we argue that higher audit hours by industry specialists 
are not driven by a lower hourly rate. We compute the fees per hours for a subsample of firms for 
which we have both audit fees and audit hours and then we use the natural logarithm of the 
hourly rate as the dependent variable. The coefficients on the industry leader variables are 
positive and insignificant, confirming that higher audit hours by industry specialists are not 
driven by a lower hourly rate. 
5. CONCLUSION  
 Our paper examines how auditor national industry expertise and area industry expertise is 
organized in Italy where mandatory audit firm rotation has been in effect since 1975. Industry 
expertise is a conduit to the transfer of industry specific-knowledge by auditors. Italy has higher 
client turnover, because of a nine-year mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) requirement, and 
it also has a smaller publicly-listed client audit market than the U.S. We predict that national 
industry expertise is stronger than area industry expertise because higher client turnover, and a 
small audit market, increases the sensitivity of industry-specific knowledge being lost at the local 
area level. We find that audit fees of industry specialists at the national level and the area level 
are greater than non-specialists. We do not find the same evidence for city industry specialists. 
However, different from prior studies that are restricted to countries with voluntary audit firm 
rotation (Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005; Basioudis and Francis 2007), we find that 
national industry specialization dominates over area industry specialization in audit fee 
premiums and audit hours, suggesting there is greater centralization of industry specialization in 
Italy. We conduct the same analysis for companies located in Germany which has a similar legal 
and regulatory characteristics, but does not have MAFR. We find no difference between the audit 
fee premiums of national industry specialists and area industry specialists. However, the sample 
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size for Germany is larger. We conclude that the higher client rotation of MAFR is a contributing 
factor, as well as a smaller audit market size. Our study has a number of implications for 
regulators and legislators considering to adopt MAFR.  
 One implication is that MAFR appears to weaken the local level of industry expertise 
which can effect audit quality as a whole. More frequent turnover of clients requires industry 
expert audit personnel to either adopt another industry, or else relocate, when a significant 
number of clients depart from an industry and are not replaced. This effectively can create a 
“brain drain” of client and industry specific knowledge, thus shifting a greater burden on the 
national headquarters to nationalize industry expertise, such as through national industry specific 
training programs and consulting industry experts. Our results show that audit fee premiums and 
audit hour premiums are greater for national industry experts than that of area industry experts, 
and the differences are statistically and economically significant. A potential consequence is that 
with more frequent turnover of clients, auditor quality is weakened at the office level where 
engagement partners and staff have a more intimate knowledge of the client. However, their 
industry knowledge has a shorter useful life and can depreciate quickly with the loss of expert 
personnel to other offices or other industries. Combined national and local levels of audit quality 
could be lower than in countries without MAFR, if national industry expertise cannot sufficiently 
compensate for the loss of local level expertise. 
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Table 1– Audit Firm Industry Leaders by Year and Industry – Italy Sample 
Panel A – National Leaders   
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
10 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC EY EY EY 
15 EY EY EY EY EY EY KPMG KPMG KPMG 
20 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC KPMG 
25 DT DT PWC DT EY DT DT DT EY 
30 PWC PWC PWC EY EY EY PWC PWC PWC 
35 EY EY EY EY DT DT DT EY PWC 
45 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC EY EY EY 
55 KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG EY EY 
The above table reports the Big 4 audit firm with the greatest market share of client sales by year 
and industry. Market shares are based on 1,970 firm-year observations (Table 2, Panel A). Each 
industry has at least two audit firms in each industry-year.  
 
Big 4 audit firm abbreviations are as follows: 
DT = Deloitte & Touche 
EY = Ernst & Young 
KPMG = KPMG 
PWC = PricewaterhouseCoopers 
 
Industry definitions, based on Global Industry Classification Standards (GICS), are as follows: 
GICS 10 - Energy 
GICS 15 - Materials 
GICS 20 - Industrials 
GICS 25 - Consumer Discretionary 
GICS 30 - Consumer Staples 
GICS 35 - Health Care 
GICS 45 - Information Technology 
GICS 55 - Utilities 
We exclude industry 40 (Financial Services) because it is too dissimilar and we exclude industry 50 
(Telecommunications) because it has too few client firms to estimate industry expertise.  
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Table 1 – Audit Firm Industry Leaders by Year and Industry – Italy Sample (cont.) 
Panel B – Area Leaders   
NORTH 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
10 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC EY EY EY 
15 EY EY EY EY EY EY KPMG KPMG KPMG 
20 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC DT PWC DT DT 
25 DT DT PWC DT EY DT DT DT EY 
30 PWC PWC PWC EY EY EY PWC PWC PWC 
35 EY EY EY EY DT DT DT PWC PWC 
45 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC EY EY EY 
55 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC DT PWC 
 
CENTER-
SOUTH 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
10 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC EY EY EY 
15 DT PWC PWC KPMG KPMG PWC PWC PWC PWC 
20 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC KPMG 
25 KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG DT DT EY 
30 KPMG KPMG KPMG PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
35 EY EY EY EY EY EY EY EY DT 
45 DT DT DT PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
55 KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG 
 
KPMG KPMG KPMG EY EY 
The above table reports the Big 4 audit firm with the greatest market share of client sales by area, year and industry. 
Market shares are based on 1,970 firm-year observations (Table 2, Panel A). Italy is divided into two areas- the North, 
and the Center-South, based on the EUROSTAT (European Commission, 2014), and the Italian Institute of Statistics 
(ISTAT 2014) standard geographic definitions. We require that a particular area, industry and year have at least two 
audit firms, in order to define it as a leader. We aggregate the Center and South areas into one area in order to have 
sufficient observations to compute industry expertise. The aggregation into one area is consistent with the organization 
of the Big 4 firms (Mazza, Azzali, & Reichelt, 2017).  
  
32 
 
Table 2 – Sample Selection  
Italy Sample 
Sample for computing auditor expertise N 
Italian non-financial and non-telecommunication companies from Compustat Global 
with GICS codes for the period 2005-2013 
2,096 
Delete observations with missing values necessary to compute auditor expertise  -126 
Observations for further analysis using market share based on sales  1,970 
Sample for Audit fee analysis  
Number of observations from panel A 1,970 
Delete observations with missing values for audit fees and control variables -920 
Final sample for audit fees analysis 1,050 
Sample for Audit hours analysis  
Number of observations from panel A 1,970 
Delete observations with missing values for audit hours and control variables -847 
Final sample for audit hours analysis 1,123 
 
Audit fee analysis Audit hours analysis 
Year Unique firms Year Unique firms 
2005 84 2005 112 
2006 104 2006 122 
2007 119 2007 137 
2008 120 2008 122 
2009 122 2009 124 
2010 117 2010 118 
2011 129 2011 130 
2012 125 2012 126 
2013 130 2013 132 
2005-2013 1,050 2005-2013 1,123 
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Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Multivariate Analysis 
Italy Sample 
 Mean Std. Dev. 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
LAH 7.217 0.815 6.617 7.159 7.758 
LAF  11.601 0.827 11.015 11.579 12.086 
SIZE 6.272 1.755 5.051 6.022 7.459 
CATA 0.500 0.212 0.339 0.488 0.665 
QUICK 1.151 0.931 0.699 0.941 1.316 
LEV 0.642 0.192 0.538 0.661 0.772 
ROA 0.010 0.080 -0.009 0.020 0.046 
LOSS 0.297 0.457 0.000 0.000 1.000 
σ (CFO) 0.461 0.274 0.279 0.415 0.587 
SALES GROWTH 0.621 12.575 -0.047 0.044 0.140 
TENURE 3.923 2.313 2.000 4.000 6.000 
|ACCR_1| -3.754 1.332 -4.440 -3.599 -2.847 
BIGN 0.886 0.318 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UNCLEAN OPINION 0.682 0.466 0.000 1.000 1.000 
LABOR COST 42.301 0.769 42.573 42.573 42.573 
National Leader  0.352 0.478 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Area Leader  0.397 0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000 
City Leader 0.379 0.485 0.000 0.000 1.000 
See Appendix B for variable definitions. 
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Table 4 – Correlation Analysis - Italy Sample 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 LAH 1.000                  
2 LAF 0.916 1.000                 
3 SIZE 0.558 0.544 1.000                
4 CATA -0.134 -0.142 -0.438 1.000               
5 QUICK -0.275 -0.233 -0.130 0.206 1.000              
6 LEV 0.194 0.152 0.165 -0.014 -0.572 1.000             
7 ROA 0.074 0.061 0.182 0.111 0.128 -0.400 1.000            
8 LOSS -0.073 -0.076 -0.250 -0.029 -0.085 0.250 -0.666 1.000           
9 σ (CFO) -0.188 -0.207 -0.374 0.215 -0.044 0.118 -0.183 0.173 1.000          
10 
SALES 
GROWTH -0.096 -0.104 -0.046 -0.027 -0.027 0.057 -0.005 0.028 0.107 1.000         
11 TENURE 0.079 0.095 0.091 -0.088 -0.033 -0.076 0.011 0.021 -0.054 -0.049 1.000        
12 |ACCR_1| -0.107 -0.078 -0.260 0.168 -0.017 0.091 -0.146 0.093 0.250 0.090 -0.051 1.000       
13 BIGN 0.207 0.254 0.309 -0.134 0.051 -0.080 0.146 -0.153 -0.167 -0.109 0.115 -0.098 1.000      
14 
UNCLEAN 
OPINION 0.014 -0.035 -0.046 0.022 -0.003 0.035 -0.126 0.110 0.057 -0.008 0.029 0.003 -0.016 1.000     
15 
LABOR 
COST -0.018 0.003 0.036 0.020 -0.016 0.002 0.084 -0.051 0.033 0.015 0.056 -0.013 -0.107 -0.013 1.000    
16 
National 
Leader  0.256 0.267 0.265 -0.030 0.024 0.010 0.133 -0.149 -0.129 -0.031 0.123 -0.104 0.264 0.070 -0.041 1.000   
17 
Area 
Leader 0.228 0.230 0.321 -0.079 0.063 0.014 0.120 -0.154 -0.105 -0.034 0.152 -0.089 0.291 0.050 -0.122 0.702 1.000  
18 
City Leader 
0.208 0.209 0.387 -0.082 0.067 0.026 0.165 -0.188 -0.099 -0.033 0.075 -0.111 0.228 -0.002 0.094 0.466 0.577 1.000 
See Appendix B for variable definitions. Correlation coefﬁcients in bold are signiﬁcant at 5%.
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Table 5 – Multivariate Analysis of Audit Fees and Auditor Industry Leadership – Italy 
Sample 
Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of audit fees (N=1,050) 
Panel A Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
  Estimate 
p-
value 
Estimate 
p-
value 
Estimate 
p-
value 
Intercept 10.470 <0.001 10.266 <0.001 10.521 <0.001 
SIZE 0.268 <0.001 0.272 <0.001 0.282 <0.001 
CATA 0.628 0.015 0.647 0.014 0.653 0.013 
QUICK -0.216 <0.001 -0.219 <0.001 -0.212 <0.001 
LEV -0.489 0.118 -0.489 0.121 -0.469 0.138 
ROA -0.669 0.165 -0.667 0.178 -0.643 0.199 
LOSS 0.108 0.178 0.102 0.205 0.097 0.228 
σ (CFO) -0.054 0.771 -0.066 0.718 -0.053 0.774 
SALES GROWTH -0.004 <0.001 -0.004 <0.001 -0.004 <0.001 
TENURE 0.005 0.678 0.005 0.658 0.008 0.474 
|ACCR_1| 0.037 0.051 0.035 0.070 0.035 0.069 
BIGN 0.197 0.050 0.224 0.027 0.255 0.012 
UNCLEAN OPINION 0.000 0.993 0.010 0.846 0.018 0.736 
LABOR COST -0.013 0.776 -0.009 0.858 -0.016 0.729 
National Leader  0.205 0.002     
Area Leader   0.114 0.079   
City Leader     0.006 0.929 
Industry and Year fixed effects included  included  included  
Adj. R2 0.406 0.397 0.407 
Coefﬁcient p-values in Panel A are two-tailed and robust standard errors are clustered by firm, following Peterson (2009). F-test 
p-values in Panel B are one-tailed. Refer to Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions.  
Panel B : test of difference in 
coefficients 
  Difference 
in 
Coefficients  
F-Test          
(p-
value) 
  
National Leader  = Area Leader     0.091 5.09 
(0.024) 
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Table 6 – Multivariate Analysis of Audit Hours and Auditor Industry Leadership – Italy 
Sample 
Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of audit hours (N=1,123) 
Panel A Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
  Estimate 
p-
value 
Estimate 
p-
value 
Estimate 
p-
value 
Intercept 7.249 <0.001 7.028 <0.001 7.252 <0.001 
SIZE 0.280 <0.001 0.284 <0.001 0.290 <0.001 
CATA 0.753 0.002 0.766 0.003 0.771 0.002 
QUICK -0.235 <0.001 -0.236 <0.001 -0.231 <0.001 
LEV -0.281 0.333 -0.274 0.349 -0.254 0.385 
ROA -0.037 0.925 -0.017 0.966 0.000 0.999 
LOSS 0.161 0.012 0.157 0.015 0.152 0.019 
σ (CFO) -0.012 0.940 -0.023 0.884 -0.017 0.915 
SALES GROWTH -0.004 <0.001 -0.004 <0.001 -0.004 <0.001 
TENURE 0.000 0.969 0.001 0.927 0.004 0.743 
|ACCR_1| 0.017 0.336 0.015 0.400 0.015 0.398 
BIGN 0.059 0.521 0.082 0.379 0.109 0.241 
UNCLEAN OPINION 0.065 0.174 0.076 0.121 0.083 0.090 
LABOR COST -0.027 0.364 -0.023 0.460 -0.030 0.322 
National Leader  0.183 0.005     
Area Leader   0.101 0.094   
City Leader     0.014 0.832 
Industry and Year fixed effects included  included  included  
Adj. R2 0.432 0.425 0.436 
Coefﬁcient p-values in Panel A are two-tailed and robust standard errors are clustered by firm, following Peterson (2009). F-test 
p-values in Panel B are one-tailed. Refer to Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions.  
Panel B : test of difference in 
coefficients 
  Difference 
in 
Coefficients  
F-Test          
(p-
value) 
  
National Leader  = Area Leader     0.082 3.97 
(0.046) 
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Table 7 – Audit Firm Leaders by Year and Industry – Germany Sample (cont.) 
Panel A – National Leaders 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
10 PWC KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG PWC PWC 
15 PWC KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG 
20 KPMG KPMG PWC KPMG EY PWC PWC PWC PWC 
25 KPMG KPMG KPMG PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
30 PKF KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG 
35 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
45 KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG 
55 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
The above table reports the Big 4 audit firm with the greatest market share of client sales by year 
and industry. Market shares are based on 4,217 firm-year observations (Table 2, Panel B). Each 
industry has at least two audit firms in each industry-year. 
 
Big 4 audit firm abbreviations are as follows: 
DT = Deloitte & Touche 
EY = Ernst & Young 
KPMG = KPMG 
PWC = PricewaterhouseCoopers 
 
Non-Big 4 audit firm abbreviations are as follows: 
PKF – PKF  
 
Industry definitions, based on Global Industry Classification Standards (GICS), are as follows: 
GICS 10 - Energy 
GICS 15 - Materials 
GICS 20 - Industrials 
GICS 25 - Consumer Discretionary 
GICS 30 - Consumer Staples 
GICS 35 - Health Care 
GICS 45 - Information Technology 
GICS 55 - Utilities 
We exclude industry 40 (Financial Services) because it is too dissimilar and we exclude industry 50 
(Telecommunications) because it has too few client firms to estimate industry expertise.  
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Table 7 – Audit Firm Leaders by Year and Industry – Germany Sample (cont.) 
Panel B - Area Leaders  
EAST 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
10 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
15 EY KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG 
20 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
25 KPMG KPMG PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
30 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
35 PWC PWC PWC EY EY EY EY EY EY 
45 EY KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KMPG KPMG KPMG KPMG 
55 EY EY EY EY EY KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG 
 
WEST 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
10 PWC KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG 
15 PWC KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG PWC 
20 KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG EY EY EY EY EY 
25 KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG 
30 PKF KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG 
35 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC KPMG 
45 KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG 
55 PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC 
The above table reports the Big 4 audit firm with the greatest market share of client sales by area, year and industry. 
Market shares are based on 4,217 firm-year observations (Table 2, Panel B). Germany is divided into two areas- East 
and West, based on the EUROSTAT (European Commission, 2014) standard geographic definitions. East includes 
the following subdivisions: Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saxony, 
Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia. West includes Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Lower 
Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein. We require that a particular area, industry and year 
have at least two audit firms, in order to define it as a leader. Areas without a leader in a particular industry and year 
have only one audit firm. 
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Table 8 – Sample Selection (cont.) 
Germany Sample 
Sample for computing auditor expertise N 
German non-financial and non-telecommunication companies from Compustat Global 
with GICS codes for the period 2005-2013 
5,245 
Delete observations with missing values necessary to compute auditor expertise 
(auditor data) 
-1,028 
Observations for further analysis using market share based on sales  4,217 
Delete observations with missing values for audit fees and control variables -1,307 
Final sample for audit fees analysis 2,910 
 
Audit fee analysis 
Year Unique firms 
2005 245 
2006 314 
2007 338 
2008 328 
2009 337 
2010 338 
2011 350 
2012 337 
2013 323 
2005-2013 2,910 
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Table 9 – Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Multivariate Analysis (cont.) 
Germany Sample 
 Mean Std. Dev. 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
LAF  5.407 1.210 4.553 5.242 6.054 
SIZE 5.485 2.167 3.985 5.173 6.797 
CATA 0.533 0.202 0.391 0.539 0.674 
QUICK 1.567 1.722 0.784 1.123 1.762 
LEV 0.126 0.145 0.004 0.082 0.193 
ROA 0.040 0.140 0.013 0.056 0.099 
LOSS 0.245 0.430 0.000 0.000 0.000 
σ (CFO) 0.293 0.690 0.053 0.095 0.218 
SALES GROWTH 0.119 0.918 -0.036 0.055 0.154 
TENURE 4.778 3.184 2.000 4.000 7.000 
|ACCR_1| -3.065 1.188 -3.679 -2.920 -2.318 
BIGN 0.711 0.454 0.000 1.000 1.000 
UNCLEAN OPINION 0.095 0.293 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LABOR COST 51.241 4.767 49.421 51.388 54.219 
National Leader  0.186 0.389 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Area Leader  0.213 0.410 0.000 0.000 0.000 
City Leader 0.287 0.453 0.000 0.000 1.000 
See Appendix B for variable definitions. 
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Table 10 – Correlation Analysis (cont.) 
Germany Sample 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 LAF 1.00                 
2 SIZE 0.89 1.00                
3 CATA -0.26 -0.27 1.00               
4 QUICK -0.23 -0.20 0.37 1.00              
5 LEV 0.21 0.18 -0.44 -0.24 1.00             
6 ROA 0.16 0.26 0.00 0.02 -0.09 1.00            
7 LOSS -0.13 -0.22 -0.01 -0.04 0.10 -0.57 1.00           
8 σ (CFO) 0.004 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 0.01 1.00          
9 
SALES 
GROWTH -0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.05 0.01 1.00         
10 TENURE 0.21 0.18 -0.04 -0.05 0.03 0.12 -0.11 -0.04 -0.04 1.00        
11 |ACCR_1| -0.12 -0.16 0.01 -0.02 0.10 -0.17 0.16 0.05 -0.04 -0.05 1.00       
12 BIGN 0.39 0.39 -0.09 -0.04 0.02 0.11 -0.05 -0.01 0.003 0.05 -0.03 1.00      
13 
UNCLEAN 
OPINION -0.08 -0.14 0.02 -0.06 0.10 -0.27 0.23 -0.01 0.02 -0.08 0.11 -0.09 1.00     
14 
LABOR 
COST 0.06 0.09 -0.08 -0.01 0.03 0.10 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.09 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 1.00    
15 
National 
Leader  0.32 0.30 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.10 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 0.09 -0.04 0.30 -0.08 -0.04 1.00   
16 
Area Leader 
0.31 0.31 -0.10 -0.02 0.02 0.07 -0.05 0.06 -0.03 0.11 -0.04 0.33 -0.08 -0.04 0.56 1.00  
17 
City Leader 
0.38 0.39 -0.09 -0.03 0.05 0.08 -0.09 0.01 -0.03 0.10 -0.04 0.30 -0.02 -0.03 0.29 0.44 1.00 
See Appendix B for variable definitions. Correlation coefﬁcients in bold are signiﬁcant at 5%. 
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Table 11 – Multivariate Analysis of Audit Fees and Auditor Industry Leadership – 
Germany Sample 
Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of audit fees (N=2,910) 
Panel A Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
  Estimate 
p-
value 
Estimate 
p-
value 
Estimate 
p-
value 
Intercept 2.162 0.000 2.134 0.000 2.213 0.000 
SIZE 0.492 0.000 0.493 0.000 0.493 0.000 
CATA 0.023 0.852 0.027 0.825 0.022 0.857 
QUICK -0.036 0.001 -0.037 0.000 -0.036 0.001 
LEV 0.262 0.079 0.253 0.088 0.244 0.104 
ROA -0.485 0.000 -0.473 0.001 -0.467 0.001 
LOSS 0.082 0.019 0.082 0.020 0.087 0.014 
σ (CFO) -0.047 0.183 -0.051 0.146 -0.049 0.171 
SALES GROWTH -0.028 0.000 -0.028 0.000 -0.029 0.000 
TENURE 0.018 0.001 0.018 0.001 0.019 0.001 
|ACCR_1| 0.005 0.606 0.006 0.581 0.005 0.608 
BIGN 0.113 0.021 0.113 0.021 0.130 0.007 
UNCLEAN OPINION 0.110 0.016 0.109 0.019 0.101 0.028 
LABOR COST -0.003 0.482 -0.003 0.469 -0.003 0.433 
National Leader  0.145 0.002     
Area Leader   0.122 0.027   
City Leader     0.057 0.227 
Industry and Year fixed effects included  included  included  
Adj. R2 0.819 0.819 0.818 
Coefﬁcient p-values in Panel A are two-tailed and robust standard errors are clustered by firm, following Peterson 
(2009). F-test p-values in Panel B are one-tailed. Refer to Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions.
Panel B : test of difference in 
coefficients 
  Difference 
in 
Coefficients  
F-Test          
(p-
value) 
  
National Leader  = Area Leader     0.023 0.79 
0.373 
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Appendix A - Comparison of Auditor Industry Leadership Audit Fee Premiums from Prior 
Studies 
Industry Leadership Coefficient (Premium/Discount) 
Study, Country, and Time Period National Level Office Level 
Ferguson et al. (2003) – Australia (1998) 0.069 (7.1%) 0.143 (15.4%) 
Francis et al. (2005)– US (2000-01) 0.075 (7.8%) 0.121 (12.9%) 
Basioudis and Francis (2007)– UK (2002-03) 0.018‡ (1.8%) 0.145 (15.6%) 
Cahan et al. (2011)- US (2003-07) 0.073 (7.6%)  
Numan and Willekens (2012) – US (2005-06) -0.040‡ (-3.9%) 0.133 (14.2%) 
Fung, Gul, and Krishnan (2012) – US (2000-07)  0.138 (14.8%) 
Bae et al. (2016)– S. Korea (2001-10)  0.077 (8.0%)  
‡ - coefficient is not statistically significant at 5% (two-tailed). 
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Appendix B- Variable Definitions  
Dependent Variables used in Audit Fees and Hours analysis (source: annual shareholder 
meeting minutes) 
LAF = natural logarithm of total audit fees for the audit of consolidated financial 
statements and separate audits of the financial statements of the parent and the 
subsidiaries (winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles) 
LAH = natural logarithm of audit hours for the audit of consolidated financial 
statements (winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles) 
Expertise Variables (source: Compustat Global (total sales and GICS), Eurostat (area), and 
annual shareholder meeting minutes (audit firm and location)) 
National 
Industry  
specialist 
The audit firm with the largest market share (client total sales) by two-digit 
GICS and year. 
Area 
Industry 
Specialist 
The audit firm with the largest market share (client total sales) by two-digit 
GICS, area, and year. There are two areas: North, and Center-South. 
City 
Industry 
Specialist 
The audit firm with the largest market share (client total sales) by two-digit 
GICS, city, and year. There are twenty cities, based on the twenty regions, in 
Italy: North (Valle d’Aosta, Veneto, Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia, 
Emilia Romagna, Lombardia, Liguria, Piemonte), Center (Lazio, Toscana, 
Umbria, Marche) and South (Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Basilicata, Puglia, 
Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna). 
Control variables (winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles) (source: Compustat Global, except 
as indicated) 
SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the ﬁscal year; 
σ (CFO) = the standard deviation of operating cash ﬂow scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of the ﬁscal year; 
LEV = total long-term debt scaled by total assets at the end of the ﬁscal year; 
LOSS = 1 if net income < 0, and 0 otherwise; 
SALES 
GROWTH 
= (revenuet – revenuet-1)/revenuet-1 for the fiscal year ended; 
TENURE = tenure of the audit firm (minimum of one year and maximum of nine 
years). (source: annual shareholder meeting minutes); 
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|ACCR 1| = absolute value of total accruals in year t − 1 scaled by total assets at the end 
of t – 1 (in logarithm in the audit fees and hours models); 
BIGN = 1 if audited by a Big N auditor, and 0 otherwise. (source: annual 
shareholder meeting minutes); 
CATA = ratio of current assets to total assets; 
  
QUICK = ratio of current assets (less inventories) to current liabilities; 
ROA = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; 
UNCLEAN 
OPINION 
= 1 if the audit opinion in not unqualified (additional language, qualified, 
adverse, or no opinion)  and 0 if unqualified; 
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Appendix C – Examples of Audit Fee Disclosures Extracted from the Minutes of the 
Annual Shareholder Meeting 
The following examples are audit fee and hour disclosures extracted from English translations of 
the minutes of annual shareholder meetings provided by the firm’s website. Original Italian 
versions are available from the Borsa Italiana SpA website: 
http://www.borsaitaliana.it/homepage/homepage.en.htm.  
 
1. PIRELLI & C. S.p.A. 
Available from: 
http://www.pirelli.com/mediaObject/corporate/documents/common/assemblea/may_2013/13052
013-Minutes_of_the_Ordinary_and_Extraordinary_Shareholders-_Meeting/original/13052013-
Minutes_of_the_Ordinary_and_Extraordinary_Shareholders%27_Meeting.pdf 
ORDINARY SHAREHOLDERS' MEETING ON MAY 13, 2013 
(English courtesy translation – the Italian version shall prevail) 
 The Ordinary and Extraordinary Shareholders' Meeting of PIRELLI & C. S.p.A. (hereinafter, 
the “Company” or “Pirelli”) began at 10:30 a.m. on May 13, 2013 in Milan, Viale Sarca n. 214. 
Mr. Marco Tronchetti Provera chaired the Shareholders' Meeting pursuant to the Bylaws and, 
with the unanimous approval of those present, he asked Prof. Piergaetano Marchetti to act as 
Secretary of the meeting. Prof. Marchetti accepted this request and expressed his thanks. First of 
all, the Chairman announced that the Shareholders’ Meeting has been called to discuss and 
resolve on the following:  
AGENDA 
1. Financial Statements as at 31st December 2012. Inherent and consequent resolutions 
2. …. 
*** (page 18) 
Before opening discussion on the first item on the agenda, the Chairman announced that the fee 
charged by the accounting firm, Reconta Ernst & Young S.p.A.  
 totalled euro 64,350, for a total of 1,073 hours, to audit the Annual Financial Report 2012 of 
Pirelli & C. S.p.A.;  
 totalled euro 123,350, for a total of 1,493 hours, to audit the Consolidated Financial Statements 
2012 of the Pirelli & C. Group; 
  totalled euro 64,060, for a total of 642 hours, for the limited audit of the Half Yearly Financial 
Report at June 30, 2012 of the Pirelli & C. Group; 
- stated that, as reported last year, these fees are in addition to the fee of euro 16,000 for the 
activities connected with the fairness opinion on certain of the information contained in the 
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Report on Corporate Governance and the Structure of Share Ownership 2012, pursuant to Article 
123-bis of Legislative Decree 58/1998;  
- he also observed that the time and fees charged for auditing the annual report also included the 
billable time dedicated to auditing proper record-keeping by the Company and proper accounting 
of operations in the Company ledgers.  
These fees do not include out-of-pocket expenses and the Consob supervisory fee, which are 
billed at cost.
 
2. DAVIDE CAMPARI-MILANO S.p.A 
Available from: 
http://www.camparigroup.com/sites/default/files/docs/minutes_of_the_ordinary_shareholders_m
eeting_of_davide_campari-milano_s.p.a._of_30_april_2014_final.pdf  
MINUTES OF THE ORDINARY SHAREHOLDERS’ MEETING OF DAVIDE CAMPARI-
MILANO S.p.A. OF 30 APRIL 2014 
The ordinary shareholders’ meeting of Davide Campari-Milano S.p.A., with registered office at 
20, Via Franco Sacchetti, 20099 Sesto San Giovanni (Milan), share capital of € 58,080,000.00 
(fully paid up), tax and VAT code and registration number in the Milan Companies’ Register 
06672120158, took place at single call at 9:30 on 30 April 2014, at the premises of the Campari 
Academy at via Campari 23, to discuss and pass resolutions on the following  
Agenda 
1. Approval of the annual financial statements for the year ending 31 December 2013 and 
related resolutions; 
2. … 
… 
The Chairman also explained that: 
- with regard to the auditing of the financial statements, pursuant to Consob Communication 
DAC/RM/96003558 of 18 April 1996, the meeting was notified that: (i) PricewaterhouseCoopers 
S.p.A. spent 2,985 working hours on the audit of the draft separate financial statements and the 
consolidated financial statements to 31 December 2013, broken down as follows: statutory audit 
of the separate annual financial statements and review of the accounting procedures, pursuant to 
articles 14 and 16 of Legislative Decree 39 of 27 January 2010, 2,135 hours; and statutory audit 
of the consolidated financial statements, 850 hours; (ii) the projected invoiced amount was € 
202,000, of which € 127,000 for the audit of the separate financial statements and € 75,000 for 
the audit of the consolidated financial statements, in accordance with the resolution of the 
shareholders’ meeting that conferred the auditing assignment.  
